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Discussant's Response to "Why the Auditing 
Standards on Evaluating Internal Control 
Needed to be Replaced" 
William R. Kinney, Jr. 
University of Texas at Austin 
In a way, I feel that I should apologize for not joining Jerry and the AICPA 
Auditing Division leadership in supporting their response to the alleged 
expectations gap. One would like to support the profession that one studies and 
about which one teaches. However, it is traditional for a scholarly discussant to 
take a position contrary to that of the author. That will be easy for me to do 
since, as most of you know, I hold a contrary view on the need to replace AU 
320. 
It is also traditional to critically discuss a paper on the basis of its own 
criteria and to discuss the topic of the paper from an alternative perspective. I 
will follow the traditional approach, but in reverse order. I will begin by giving a 
little background on the role of Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs) in 
general, and the role and importance of AU 320 or Statement of Auditing 
Procedure (SAP) No. 54. 
GAAS and SASs 
As we all know, SASs are codified interpretations of Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards (GAAS). They are quasi-legal in nature and help define 
acceptable practice under the securities acts as well as within the ethical rules 
of the profession. Codified professional standards play two important and 
related roles. They serve a before-the-fact educational role of guiding the 
auditor as to what should be done to conduct a "standard quality" audit under 
GAAS. They also serve an after-the-fact enforcement role in determining 
whether an auditor has been guilty of "malpractice." The first helps the 
profession by facilitating uniform, high quality audits and the second helps the 
profession by making it easier to disassociate itself from low quality audits. 
Thus, the SASs are important and they should be clearly worded and be readily 
interpretable. 
Traditionally, SASs have related almost exclusively to the effectiveness of 
audits—that is, regulation to make sure that audits are effective in achieving 
appropriately low audit risk that error might exceed material limits. Some 
practitioners read the SASs as providing minimum requirements for a legal 
defense, and the minimum is their target. Without auditor quality differentia-
tion, the SASs may also provide the maximum service in a competitive market. 
Therefore, it is important to have the effectiveness minimum clearly stated. 
Efficiency, or the achievement of a given level of audit risk at minimum cost, 
has, with rare exception, been left unregulated or left without comment by the 
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Auditing Standards Board (ASB) for two reasons. First, in a competitive 
market, practitioners can be expected to be efficient on their own. Second, 
there is no long-run danger to the public of inefficient auditing—the market will 
discipline inefficient auditors. 
SAP No. 54 (now AU 320) has had a revolutionary, and I believe salutary, 
effect on auditing practice, education, and research. Several generations of 
professors, textbook writers, students, and regulators have learned about the 
inherent limitations of internal control and the related necessity of substantive 
testing, the reasons behind segregation of duties, the necessity of compliance 
testing if controls are to be relied upon, the logical basis for evidence 
integration, and the basic concepts of control of audit risk. It has stood the test 
of time in practice and in research—many professors have tried to shoot holes 
in it and could not. Perhaps most important to us here, it gave a conceptual 
evidence model of auditing that has provided the basis for respect for auditing 
professors on campus. Many of us in this room are here due, in part, to SAP 
No. 54. 
Certainly AU 320 is not perfect and it could use some updating and editing. 
In that regard, many of you are aware of my controversial letter of March 26, 
1987 to Alan Winters. It was a response to his invitation to comment on the 
exposure draft (ED) of SAS No. 55. I read the ED with the view that, I 
believed, a skeptical, ''minimum requirements-seeking" practitioner or ac-
countant's defense attorney might take. Since AU 320 would be eliminated by 
the ED, I tried to read the ED without reliance on what I knew was in AU 320 
because the next generation of students, auditors, and "enforcers" will have 
to read, understand, and apply SAS No. 55 cold! 
In his response to the planning subcommittee (May 15, 1987), and the 
entire ASB (June 2, 1987), Al stated that there was little problem with the 
exposure draft but that I simply didn't read the words as he had meant them. 
The latter is true, of course. Both letters are in the public record if you wish to 
study the issues for yourself. I encourage you to try to read SAS No. 55 from 
the perspective of one who doesn't already know about AU 320. 
I am pleased to say that I believe the current draft of SAS No. 55 is a 
considerable improvement over the exposure draft of last year. This is 
because, in effect, it adds back a number of the AU 320 concepts. Whether the 
present draft of SAS No. 55 is a net improvement over AU 320, or indeed, if 
the benefits of its passage outweigh its costs, is not at all clear to me. 
The net benefits of SAS No. 55 are also not clear to others as evidenced by 
the fact that six ASB members had dissents or qualified assents to its issuance. 
Their number includes partners from five national accounting firms and the 
accounting professor, Jim Loebbecke. The audit firms are Ernst and Whinney, 
Grant Thornton, Laventhol & Horwath, Peat Marwick Main, and Price 
Waterhouse. Their stated concerns include illogical reasoning, confusing 
exposition that is likely to lead to over-reliance on controls, unnecessary 
changes of wording with no change in concept, and the need for stronger 
procedures to support the auditor's "understanding" of the control structure. 
That is, the dissenters are asking for more rigor as to effectiveness and more 
clarity! 
This reception by a substantial minority of Board members can be 
contrasted with that of SAS No. 47 on Audit Risk and Materiality. SAS No. 47 
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was peculiar in that it added "structure" to the official literature, but its task 
force chairman (a Big-Eight partner and ASB member) wanted a 15-0 vote and 
held up a ballot draft until all objections by all parties were accommodated. A 
required 60% majority supported a more structured SAS but structure was 
diluted in order to get unanimity. For example, a requirement for "preliminary 
estimates" of materiality was replaced by the more vague "judgments about" 
materiality. Also, in an attempt to make the SAS "less quantitative in tone," 
the title was changed from "Materiality and Audit Risk" to "Audit Risk and 
Materiality." 
SAS No. 55 is peculiar in that it is arguable whether it adds more structure 
than it removes. It is also peculiar in that its task force is the first to be chaired 
by a member of the AICPA staff. In contrast to SAS No. 47, the SAS No. 55 
chairman apparently did not try to accommodate all suggestions for improve-
ment. Ironically, if the chairman had achieved unanimity, then SAS No. 55 
would have been a stronger document since the dissenters were asking for 
more guidance or clarity rather than less. In fairness to the task force 
chairman, political expediency may have necessitated foregoing further rigor 
and clarity. 
SAS No. 55 and the "Expectations Gap" 
Now, I'll discuss specifics of the Sullivan paper. I'll be very specific as to 
references so that you can verify my statements. On page 47, Jerry states that 
the nine new SASs were developed to "narrow what has been referred to as 
the 'expectations gap.'" Among the new standards is SAS No. 55 that 
"dramatically changes" the auditor's responsibility for considering internal 
control. 
If we accept Jerry's premise, then we would reasonably expect to see the 
following in a discussion of "why" AU 320 needed to be replaced: 
a. First, we would expect to see a description, listing, or citation of a 
number of highly visible audit failures due to the application of 
guidance in AU 320—that is, audits for which the auditor had properly 
applied the guidance and yet failed to detect material error. 
b. Second, we would expect to see a focus in SAS No. 55 on audit 
effectiveness. The SAS would provide means of increasing audit 
effectiveness through guidance to prevent the abuses noted. 
c. Third, we would not expect to see extensive discussion of efficiency 
or how to do an audit more cheaply or with less work since Dingell 
hasn't criticized the profession for being inefficient. 
How well does Jerry's paper and SAS No. 55 meet these three expectations? 
First, let us consider the evidence on audit failures due to following AU 320. 
On page 48, Jerry cites a "growing number" of practitioners who use 
preprinted memorandums proclaiming "no reliance on controls" yet rely on 
"effectively operating internal controls." We don't know if "growing" means 
from one to two or from 10,000 to 11,000 auditors, and Jerry doesn't claim that 
these audits were improper or ineffective. 
On pages 48 and 49 he states that AU 320 and SAS No. 47 direct the 
auditor's attention toward internal control procedures related to account 
balances and transactions and not to the accounting system or control 
environment "which most practitioners believe reduce control risk.'' Now, if 
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auditors don't rely on controls that they don't study or evaluate, then by not 
looking at the accounting system and control environment the audit may be 
inefficient. However, the audit would not necessarily be ineffective! 
On pages 49 and 50, Jerry cites research conducted at Coopers and 
Lybrand. No reference is given so apparently this is secret research about 
which one can't determine the methods used, the data examined, or whether 
there were flaws in their application or alternative interpretations of the results. 
According to the secret C&L research [Sullivan, 1988, page 49] "the problem 
is not with specific internal control procedures; rather it is related to the 
attitude, awareness and actions of management related to financial reporting." 
[emphasis added] 
Therefore, Jerry concludes that, we ought to audit management's attitude 
and awareness more and audit transactions and balances less. This is 
consistent with the views expressed in his 1984 Kansas paper [Sullivan, 1984] 
in which he championed reliance on supervisory controls verified by observa-
tion and inquiry over reliance on transaction and balance controls verified by re-
performance. 
The idea that, because few errors are discovered in tests of transactions 
and balances, we can deemphasize or even eliminate them is bothersome for 
two reasons. First, the auditor contracts to do an audit. The public expects that 
an auditor has audited transactions and balances, not just verified that 
management has a good attitude and awareness. Second, auditing behavior is 
dynamic or strategic—an analogy will suffice as explanation. There are very few 
guns detected at Kansas City International Airport. Yet, if gun control were 
reduced or eliminated, I believe that there would be many more guns leaving 
the jetway. Anticipation of detection yields prevention. 
If the official audit literature is to emphasize management's good attitude 
and awareness as a basis for assessing low control risk, then I believe that the 
ASB should tell us how much the auditor can rely on management's general 
good "attitude and awareness" to reduce substantive testing across particular 
accounts and balances. Is it a lot? Can it be 100%? Or is it a very small amount? 
There are repeated efficiency reminders in SAS No. 55. For example, 
paragraphs 31, 40-42, and 43-45 remind the auditor that results from testing 
one assertion for one account may be useful in reducing testing in another. 
Paragraph 48 and 50-52 give compliance tests as options for reliance. The 
auditor is also encouraged to rely on favorable audit results from last year 
[para. 23, 53]. It is not that the auditor should not consider such evidence, it is 
just peculiar that a document designed to increase audit effectiveness is directed 
at being efficient or, perhaps, the ex post legal protection of the auditor. There is 
only one warning and no examples that evidence from varied sources may 
conflict with or "disconfirm'' each other. Such examples and warnings would 
likely increase effectiveness. 
Finally, I'm very troubled by the suggestion, in paragraph 63, that the 
auditor try to figure out means of placing complete reliance on an assessment of 
low control risk. That is, the auditor would conduct no substantive tests for an 
assertion. The auditor is warned that "ordinarily" one cannot do this for all 
assertions on a significant account, but there is no guidance as to whether 
substantive testing should be the exception or whether complete reliance on 
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controls is the exception. (It should be noted that the new SAS on Analytical 
Review reduces this risk.) 
According to Sullivan [1988], SAS No. 55 provides a framework to improve 
control risk assessment in two respects: 
1. It establishes a requirement to assess controls in relation to financial 
statement assertions (presumably all five assertions for each financial 
statement caption). 
2. It replaces an "all or nothing," "rely or don't rely" approach with a 
more continuous approach such as percentages, or "maximum, 
moderate or minimum.'' 
Now, does anyone really believe that we needed a new SAS to explain that 
AU 320 applies to assertions? I doubt it. Second, I cannot find any statement in 
AU 320 that dictates an "all or nothing" approach. In fact, paragraphs 72 and 
73 of the original SAP No. 54 (now AU 320, 81-82) are explicit in discussing a 
variable extent of reliance and Appendix B [paragraph 35] illustrates reliance as 
being 30%, 50%, 70%, or 90%! That hardly sounds like all or nothing/rely or 
don't rely. Something is wrong here. 
Overall, I'm not sure what is going on. There is a political problem for the 
profession. Is there an expectations gap (an effectiveness problem)? Is AU 320 
part of it? Is SAS No. 55 more than the product of political-economic actions by 
the ASB? 
As we have seen, if the Sullivan explanation is correct, there are some 
surprises in the data. There are no specific abuses listed nor locatable 
references to abuses. There is little, if any, increase in effectiveness of SAS 
No. 55 over AU 320 and there is a concentration on efficiency. None of those 
supports the claim that SAS No. 55 is needed to close the alleged expectations 
gap. 
If you follow the ASB's activities, you know that the Sullivan paper is the 
fourth in a series of papers that "explain," "sell," or "excuse" SAS No. 55. 
One is by Dan Guy and Jerry Sullivan in the April, 1988 issue of Journal of 
Accountancy [Guy and Sullivan, 1988], a second is by ASB member Bob 
Temkin and Al Winters in the May, 1988 issue of Journal of Accountancy 
[Temkin and Winters, 1988], and a third will appear in the June, 1988 issue of 
Journal of Accountancy and will explain how one should apply SAS No. 55 to 
small firms. With an apparent lack of "effectiveness'' differences from AU 320, 
these papers seem to be much like advertising for "new and improved" 
laundry soap. 
Closing Statement 
In his closing statement, Jerry states that Congressman Dingell has often 
asked how auditors can examine financial statements and not know about their 
clients' internal controls. Further, he states that the answer, "I didn't rely on 
internal controls" doesn't play very well. 
I am very concerned that the answers given in SAS No. 55 won't play very 
well. That is, in defense of an audit failure, I would not like to hear: 
"I didn't do much substantive testing because management had such a 
good attitude toward controls." or, 
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"I didn't do much substantive testing because management had such 
a good system last year." 
Now these responses seem silly to the uninitiated. But you, Jerry, and Al 
Winters, and Dan Guy, and anyone else who has reviewed the files know that 
such responses will be observed in future peer reviews and perhaps in court 
cases. I, for one, would be hard-pressed to say that the particular words in SAS 
No. 55 don't lend some support to that position. 
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